Edgell (1995) does not understand t~e goals and.problems of the theoretically oriented expenmenter. ThIS lack of understanding is reflected in Edgell's comment that "theoretical work does not demand that we establish any value to an exact amount" (p. 525). The typical issue faced by theoretically oriented experimenters is not~he value of some variable, or the size of an effect, but Instead whether or not one variable influences another.
ments can have a possible null hypothesis (e.g., Loftus, 1991) . Allowing experimenters an arbitrary choice~n this matter would be inappropriate and psychology WIll not tolerate it. I do not know why Edgell claims that there is nothing special about zero; perhaps we have had different experiences, or perhaps I should have said .t~at the special word is "no"; there is a nonzero probability that one variable has no effect on a second.
Edgell and I agree that (1) the good-effort criterion violates some meta-rules for methodology, (2) everyone would prefer that these meta-rules were not violated, and (3) unfortunately statistics cannot provide a "rigorous" decision procedure for accepting the point n.ull ?ypo~h esis. My argument is that the good-effort cn.tenon VI~ lates minor meta-rules, whereas never allowing expenmenters to accept the point null hypothesis violates a more important meta-rule. Perhaps Edgell has a different ordering for the meta-rules. I proposed the me~a rules so that issues such as this could be settled by dIScussion, not fiat.
Other issues: In his first paragraph, Edgell seems to confuse taking a Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing and taking a Bayesian (i.e., subjective) approach to probabilities. My article is about convention~l hypothesis testing, which traditionally is interpreted In terms.of relative frequencies-although I would not make that Interpretation. Edgell's claim that the null hypothesis can be true might seem puzzling. I think he means that even though the probability ofthe null hypo~hesis'~being .true is "zero," the null hypothesis is not logically impossible. In other words, one can say, "Suppose the null hypothesis is true," just as one can say, "Suppose there are green men living on Mars." In his last paragraph, Edgell argues that sometimes the good-effort criterion is likely to produce errors. His claim is too weak: Sometimes the goodeffort criterion will produce errors. However, a chance of error is standard operating procedure for psychology. The fact that there are errors in some situations does not mean that errors are likely in general, so Edgell's final sentence is in logical error.
